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Abstract: This empirical paper investigates the path to bankruptcy for a sample of French 
firms in default, in particular the decision to file a petition for bankruptcy, the arbitrage 
between rescuing and liquidation and the effective survival. The procedure is depicted as a 
sequence of three steps in which judges play a crucial role as they decide whether a company 
is insolvent or not and determine whether an insolvent company deserves to be rescued or, on 
the contrary, should be liquidated, the market having the last word since the effective success 
depends on the capability of the firm to recover from the judicial proceedings. We test 
different hypotheses about the variables influencing each possibility which include i) the role 
of the market in the firm’s health, ii) the influence of financial structures, iii) the importance 
of corporate governance and iv) the inherent corporate factors of probable survival. Using 
three linked LOGIT models, our first finding is that the probability to default depends mainly 
on the market. Secondly the probability to be rescued depends essentially on the financial 
structure. Finally, the probability for the firm to remain in business in the long term is largely 
influenced by the market and profitability. Our results also support the idea that governance, 
size and resources are the main determinants of exit from the market or success of any 
company. 
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Small, alone and poor:  
a merciless portrait of insolvent French firms, 2007-2010
1
1  Introduction  
 
   In his seminal paper on corporate insolvency, Armour (2001) makes a distinction between six 
different meanings of the term “insolvency”. Departing from the colloquial sense of the word that 
has to do with an inability to pay creditors, he attempts to clarify between the accounting 
concepts of balance sheet insolvency, cash flow insolvency and economic failure on one hand 
and the judicial aspects of default that follow a path from insolvency proceedings, reorganization 
to liquidation on the other. This extensive approach to  firms  in  distress presents the huge 
advantage of encompassing the diversity of possible judgments made by commercial courts in 
cases of corporate insolvency. Moreover, such a complex and refined typology of failure is hardly 
compatible with an empirical analysis of the phenomenon which is most of the time centered on 
the determination of a discriminant function able to distinguish two classes of firms according to 
their respective economic health (Rahman et al., 2004; Sun et al., 2005; Bose and Pal, 2006). The 
problems  emerge  because corporate insolvency is still missing a general definition broadly 
accepted by the community of authors working on this topic. 
   Most of the time, a firm is considered as financially distressed whenever the book value of its 
assets is less than those of its liabilities. From this point of view, the Basel II criteria define a firm 
as being “in default” when its scheduled payments are delayed for more than 90 days. This 
approach which is focused on a cash flow conception is advantageously complemented by a 
stock perspective which compares the available assets to current liabilities (Belcher, 1997). If 
such a definition presents an indisputable use as far as one is interested in the particular situation 
of a specific company, the expert judgment it rests upon does not fit with the study of the 
general situation of a large number of companies or with the determination of a function that 
permits to separate operating firms from  insolvent  ones. To do so, a simpler but clearer 
definition of insolvency is required. This is the reason why most of the papers dealing with 
discrimination between going concerns and insolvent ones refer thus to legal rules to draw a 
clear separating line between these two classes. In this case, a company is thus considered as 
insolvent when it files for bankruptcy or when a court decides it should be liquidated.  
   However, this binary vision of firms that can either be safe or insolvent, does not fit with the 
large array of outcomes in use in the commercial courts on one hand and with the blurred 
frontier between going concerns and distressed companies on the other. This paper aims at 
producing an empirical analysis compatible with the complexity of legal rules  governing 
corporate bankruptcy. To do so, and following Marco (1989) we propose a dynamic conception 
of firm distress that begins with liquidity problems, passes through balance sheet disequilibrium 
and finishes in a commercial court where judges have to decide whether it is worth rescuing the 
company. This insolvency path is perceived  thanks to the determination of a judicial path 
resulting from the analysis of a large sample of French commercial courts’ decisions in line with 
the Insolvency Law enacted in 2006. Our aim is to provide an operative framework that makes it 
possible to understand the various forms of failure currently applied in the commercial courts 
and to highlight the intricate relationships between judicial and economic points of view on 
                                                           
1  This work  comes from a  study funded by the bank  OSEO  and published  in the book "La défaillance des 
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insolvency. This research contributes to the bankruptcy literature by examining the decisions 
made as a process scheduled by the law and implemented by the judges advocating social and 
economic interests. Unlike previous studies considering the default resolution as a binary process 
illustrated by a simple logit or probit approach, we model it as a three-step dynamic process 
which makes it possible to shed light on the rationale of the commercial courts’ decisions. 
   Our first purpose is to test whether the firms that file a petition for  bankruptcy present 
significant differences from firms that are normally operating or that have not yet discovered or 
disclosed their distressed situation. We argue that this first stage of the bankruptcy proceedings is 
crucial as the cessation of payments is the first decision made by the commercial judge who has 
to decide if the company is really insolvent or not. Giving the judge the legal right to discriminate 
between safe and insolvent companies transforms the courts into a screening device or a gate 
between the economic and judicial spheres. However the opening of proceedings does not mean 
that the insolvent firms will be automatically liquidated. Indeed, even if nearly 90% of French 
bankruptcy filings end up in liquidation (Domens, 2007) it is officially possible for the court to 
decide  on  a rescue of distressed companies. Our second purpose is then to focus on the 
characteristics of the distressed companies which  lead the judges to opt in favor of 
reorganization  (judicial settlement) instead of deciding on  an immediate liquidation. As 
underlined by an abundant literature on this topic, the crucial stake at this stage of the insolvency 
path consists in minimizing the occurrence of type 1 and type 2 errors, i.e. to liquidate firms 
whose probability of recovery is definitely compromised whereas the companies which still have 
either credit or capability to restore their market share should be supported. This alternative and 
the priority given to the firm’s survival is one of the most commented on characteristics of the 
French insolvency law and is often considered as the most tangible orientation in favor of the 
debtors’ interests to the detriment of the creditors’ rights (among many, Bhandari and Weiss, 
1996; Claessens and Klapper, 2005). Despite the lengthy judicial process and the integration of 
the various viewpoints and interests of the different stakeholders in the judgment, reorganized 
companies often fail to recover and, after some time, the liquidation is finally decided. The 
economic and social cost of what may be considered as the ineffectiveness of the commercial 
court to rescue firms with a capacity to recover (type 2 error) is high enough to justify an analysis 
of the differences between the firms which are able to start a new venture and the ones that will 
finally go bankrupt. This is thus what our third purpose consists in. 
   The analysis is based on an original dataset collected from the official bulletin of civil and 
commercial notices (BODACC) usually collected sequentially but, for the purpose of this paper, 
transformed in such a manner that any event having to do with insolvency is connected to one 
company. This  makes  it possible to reconstruct  its judicial history. We show that the 
characteristics of the distressed companies significantly differ depending on the stage of the 
process under review. The organization of the judicial proceedings attests to different degrees of 
insolvency. Our analysis also shows that French commercial judges are not motivated by a single 
aim consisting in promoting continuation in order to prevent social difficulties. Indeed, financial 
and commercial considerations are intricately mixed with employment and industrial criteria to 
determine the insolvency path of a given company, its probability to be immediately liquidated 
instead of being rescued and, finally, the success or the failure of the reorganization. 
   The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 specifies the analytical framework 
elaborated in reference to the French bankruptcy code and presents the analytical model of 
insolvency to be tested; section 3 describes the dataset, the hypotheses posed and the three-step 
logit model estimated; section 4 presents and discusses the empirical results; section 5 concludes. 3 
 
2  Analytical framework
2.1  A dynamic definition of insolvency 
: from a binary perspective to a three-stage process 
2.1.1  From separating functions… 
   Since Altman (1968), most of the models devoted to prediction of insolvency have tried to 
determine the best function to distinguish reliable companies from those that will possibly 
default in the near future
2. The main task consists then firstly to identify explanatory variables of 
default and to estimate their contribution estimating the coefficients that make it possible to 
classify accurately a set of firms in two a priori defined categories. Since the implementation of a 
linear function, proposed in the 1960s, numerous refinements have been proposed. They mainly 
concern the estimation technique and consist in the implementation of semi-parametric (logistic) 
or non-parametric (neural networks) techniques. Regardless, the result is always the same: once 
validated, the function becomes a predictive model of insolvency. The crucial point is that this 
method requires a strict definition of failure  resulting from a review of the literature and 
knowledge of default organization prior to any empirical analysis. Two polar points of view 
coexist in the literature: an economic and a judicial one. 
   From the economic point of view, failure is defined as a set of situations that reveals the 
distress of a company, such as the non-repayment of a debt used as the signal of failure by many 
scholars (Beaver, 1966, Deaken 1972, Ward and Foster, 1997). Because of the low level of 
correct classification provided by this fuzzy definition, the term “default” is no longer used to 
empirically illustrate the concept of failure. In order to escape the strict assimilation between 
insolvency and  default,  some authors have  considered  other events. A company  is  then 
considered  as  insolvent  if it  is no longer able  to meet its economic,  financial, and social 
objectives on a regular basis. Some go even further by considering that firms enter in periods of 
decline  when they  fail  to  anticipate, recognize, neutralize  or adapt to  external and internal 
pressures that threaten their long-term survival. The separation between the failing companies 
and the others based on different performance criteria is proposed by Platt and Platt (2002). 
They draw a line between going concerns and distressed firms having experienced either several 
years of losses, or decreases in the distribution of dividends or a major restructuring. Beaver 
(1966) is representative of this approach and defines the failure as the result of the inability of a 
company to meet its commitments once they have reached maturity. The results are quite poor 
and become even worse when the purpose is to discriminate between profitable firms and non-
profitable ones because no function properly separates the two classes (Peel and Peel, 1988). 
More recently, this approach has also been adopted by Bose  and Pal  (2006) who  obtained 
prediction rates ranging between 65% and 75% in their attempt to separate companies a priori 
considered as financially healthy from those which are not.  
   The problems encountered in testing the different border lines between viable firms and those 
that are going to fail come from the fact that the separation between these two situations is both 
porous and blurred. That is why numerous studies agree that the cessation of payments is the 
final step of a process, sometimes called "a spiral of failure", from which a firm can escape 
thanks to the adoption of corrective and preventive measures consisting in a modification of its 
operating cycle.  
   The second set of papers considers failure from a legal point of view. It is then defined on the 
basis of judicial criteria
                                                           
2 Bellovary et al. (2007) propose an exhaustive analysis of 165 bankruptcy prediction studies published from 1965 to 
2006 and the changes in model development. 
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period. Most legal rules considered a firm as bankrupt when the judge decides it is not able to 
make  its  repayments when the claims fall due  (Cabrillo and Depoorter, 1999).  Insolvent 
companies always conform to this mix of legal and accounting logic. At each stage of the judicial 
process, accounting considerations are introduced to strengthen the rationality of the decision 
made by the judges. Indeed, the proceeding always begins with a cessation of payments and ends 
up with a liquidation or continuation plans. To fix a point of time to signal the transition from a 
reliable and sound company to a failing one, many scholars consider that the failure occurs from 
the moment a company presents to the courts the legal documents required for its liquidation or 
reorganization. The failure is then assimilated to the entry in the insolvency proceedings. 
   Although the meaning and nature of the proceeding may differ, the arrival in a commercial 
court which registers the cessation of payments gives a simple criterion to "objectively" separate 
two  classes  of firms: those  that are  governed in accordance with  the rules  of collective 
proceedings and those which are still operating in a economic world dominated by the respect of 
contractual commitments. As in the previous set of papers, the robustness of this conception 
rests upon the binary choice provided by the judicial perspective: either the company is sound, or 
it is insolvent. The judicial definition of insolvency has given rise to much research of which we 
provide only a brief glance. 
   Proposing an empirical analysis to check out the differences between legally insolvent firms 
and those only reporting financial difficulties, Agarwal et al. (2001) and Anandarajan et al. (2001) 
determine a performing function whose exact classification rates are above 93% for both groups. 
It appears that models relying on a legal definition and separation of businesses into two classes 
lead to more reliable results than the ones based upon financial performance levels. Different 
reasons explain this superiority. Firstly, the  differences  between  failing  and  viable  firms  are 
clearer  as  one  is closer to  the cessation  of payments. Secondly, the transition  between  an 
economic order, dominated by commitments and contracts on one hand, and a judicial universe 
in which  pure  market  logic  is supplanted by  a  legal order  on the other  is clearer than an 
assessment  based  on corporate performance.  Therefore,  in the  legal order, the sequence is 
structured by a threefold stage. Firstly, it consists in the statement of cessation of payment. 
Secondly, it is followed by an arbitrage between direct liquidation and rescue which depends on 
the particular situation of the insolvent firm and the context in which the decision is made. 
Thirdly, the validity of this decision is known later if the rescued firm effectively survives
   Focusing only on the judicial decision taking place in the first or second stage presents a 
serious drawback as, in itself,  it is not representative of the gradual process followed by a 
distressed firm. As the path towards insolvency of a company must be analyzed continuously 
. 
(Daubie and Meskens
2.1.2  …to an insolvency path 
, 2002) the next section is devoted to the presentation of an insolvency 
path suitable for an analysis of ordered market exits. 
   In general, insolvency does not happen overnight. On the contrary, disruption in payments can 
be expected from previous signals. Empirical works try to identify these signals using either zeta 
score based models or a more qualitative approach. Empirical evidence does not show a clear 
causal relationship between good governance practices and good corporate performance. It is 
almost impossible to discriminate between a favorable economic conjuncture and good practices 
as causes of success. Corporate insolvency will usually be a predictable result of bad corporate 
governance when the company is still a going concern. 5 
 
Figure 1 Corporate insolvency system 
   Moreover, governance arrangements instituted in ordinary corporate life can still persist when 
companies face financial distress. If so, it is very possible that what fits a sound company may 
turn out to be completely inappropriate for an endangered firm. For instance, even though 
creditors are protected collectively in insolvency, the interests of secured creditors over their 
collateral or security are expressly excluded from the collective distribution scheme. 
Alternatively, creditors can stipulate in their contracts with the company much stricter initiating 
terms than the general requirement in insolvency law. This form of credit rationing which is not 
based  on price terms is however scarcely studied from a theoretical point of views. 
Consequently, creditors may intervene in corporate governance when such terms are satisfied 
rather than when rescue efforts will be tried in vain. Figure 1 illustrates the coexistence of two 






Figure 2: Insolvency path (Source: Marco, 1989). 
   All along this path, a mix of economic, financial and judicial criteria prevails ordered according 
to their consequences on the firm’s survival. Figure 2 illustrates what can be described as a 
cumulative scenario towards insolvency which may lead to either a direct liquidation or a judicial 
settlement involving the continuation of the undertaking (creditors are obliged to accept certain 
deadlines) or the transfer of the business (the undertaking and its main contracts are sold to a 
third party who accepts certain commitments). 
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   The decline of a company begins most of the time by mismanagement and unmarketable 
products (Crutzen and van Caillie, 2009) which may cause a decline in sales over several years 
(and a correlative decrease in earnings if nothing is done to improve the market position). In the 
worst  case, the fall-off in turnover results in a decrease in profitability,  followed by a 
deterioration of operating conditions which are at the origin of a solvency crisis. At this stage of 
the vicious circle, the company’s managers have a strong incentive to accept less favorable 
market conditions (rebates or longer terms of payment, etc.) in the hope of restoring sales and 
profitability. Such a reaction can however be counterproductive as it can cause an increase in 
trade debts and inventories, especially in the manufacturing industry. As a consequence, the 
company may be short of cash and, therefore, may face a liquidity crisis which could lead lenders 
to practice credit rationing and increase interest rates since the simultaneous increase of 
indebtedness and decrease in self-financing deteriorates the probability of repayment of such a 
debtor. Subject to a shortage of financial resources, to a decrease in the EBIT aggravated by an 
inability to repay the claims once they fall due, the company may decide to file a petition for 
bankruptcy before the creditors decide to present one to the commercial court
   The arrival in a judicial world changes the rules of the game drastically as the first consequence 
of this switch lies in the automatic stay that halts actions by creditors trying to collect debts. The 
stake is thus no longer to decide whether the company should repay or not all the claimants but, 
instead, to make a decision concerning how much debtors should repay in case of rescue or 
liquidation. The arguments in favor of each solution may differ according to the institutional 
context on one hand and the company situation on the other as detailed in the next paragraph 
devoted  to the description of an empirical model of insolvency-bankruptcy adapted to the 
French situation. 
. Once one of 
these two possible events happens, the insolvency turns into bankruptcy.  
2.2  The operative model 
 
2.2.1  Insolvency proceedings in France  
   The bankruptcy act in force in France was enacted in 2006 as French legislators decided to go 
one step further in the attempt to rescue distressed companies as the value of going concerns is 
always considered as superior to the amount of the assets sold in case of liquidation. After a brief 
reminder of the legal rules governing bankruptcy, we propose a three stage model suitable to an 
empirical application. 
   Corporate insolvency law tends to provide trade-offs between continuing operation of viable 
businesses and the elimination of irreparably damaged companies. Its main purpose is not to 
obtain a criminal punishment of the entrepreneur.  The opening  of insolvency proceedings 
against a debtor does not actually have a stigmatizing character that would deter the request 
before the situation is definitively compromised. It is, above all, the rescue of an economic 
activity, potentially able to create wealth and, therefore, jobs.  
   The bankruptcy, reorganization and liquidation proceedings in force in France are the product 
of a legal history that began in the 19
th century (Hautcoeur and Levratto, 2010). Focusing on 
rescuing companies to  preserve jobs, the 1984 Prevention of Difficulties Act (Law 84/148, 
March 1 1984) and 1985 Insolvency Law (Law 85-98, 26 January 1985), as amended by the 1994 
reforms, have significantly contributed to the “de-stigmatization” of economic failure. They mainly 
result from the need to establish a legal system facilitating the rescue of insolvent firms by 
introducing an automatic stay often leading the tenants of a Law and economic approach to 7 
 
consider it as a good example of a pro-creditor system in its attempt to protect the enterprise 
even to the extent of undermining creditors’ rights.   
   These laws  have,  however,  partially  failed in their  initial mission  to  save  businesses: 
bankruptcies were numerous, the creditors were poorly paid and the costs were high. Creditors 
have, moreover, not been sufficiently encouraged to participate in negotiations with debtors.  
   The latest advance, the law No. 2005-845 on the Protection of firms in difficulty (SADE), 
enacted July 26, 2005  and supplemented by decrees and ordinances
3
- 
, gives priority to the 
processing of business difficulties ahead of bankruptcy. This text is intended to limit the number 
of bankruptcies in France. It establishes an early procedure for bankruptcy protection, called 
“rescuing procedure” and creates a new conciliation procedure approved by the judge. Within 
the context of the new insolvency law, a distinction is now made between: 
- 
procedures selected by the debtor, i.e.  conciliation procedure and the safeguard 
procedure, 
procedures imposed on the debtor, i.e. rescuing (redressement judiciaire) and liquidation. 
   Indeed, insolvency and liquidation procedures are henceforth viewed as default procedures 
within the framework of which senior management will pay the price for its lack of foresight. It 
will be unable to profit from the advantages reserved for those who have taken the initiative of a 
conciliation or safeguard procedure. Insolvency and liquidation procedures will only apply in 
cases where conciliation or safeguard procedures have not been implemented because senior 
management did not foresee the difficulties facing the business or when these procedures have 
failed.  










Figure 3: Bankruptcy path 
                                                           
3 A decree (No. 2005-1677) of 28th December 2005, enacted on 1st January 2006, specifies laws relating to the 
prevention of business difficulties, corporate rescue, reorganization and liquidation. An ordinance (No. 2008-1345) 
of 18 December 2008 reformed the Law relating to firms in difficulty. This ordinance includes seven chapters devoted 
respectively to: the improvement of ad hoc mandate, conciliation, the attractiveness of rescuing procedure, the 
development of the insolvency proceedings, the improvement of the liquidation proceedings, responsibilities and 
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   Made up of three linked alternatives, this three-stage pattern provides an appropriate structure 
to be tested on a sample of companies. Indeed, three different tests may be implemented to 
determine the factors explaining the differences: 
-  between firms that file a petition for bankruptcy and those which do not, 
-  between rescued and liquidated companies, 
-  between survival and liquidation after a rescue attempt or reorganization 
3  Empirical analysis 
3.1  Data 
   The data base  comes  from four French sources. The first consists in  the accounting 
documents  provided by the Annual Business Survey (Enquête annuelle d'entreprises), 
undertaken by the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE). This 
database is exhaustive for firms employing more than 20 workers in the manufacturing industry 
or more than 10 employees in services. It is complemented with the Diane database provided by 
Bureau Van Dijk, which combines balance sheets, profit and loss accounts, and other elements 
describing corporate structures. The third source is the ‘financial linkages’ survey (LIFI database) 
which provides information about the main shareholders and the subsidiaries fully or partially 
owned by any company located in France. The fourth one is the Register of insolvent firms 
(Bulletin des annonces civiles et commerciales) which provides details about the practical details 
of the proceedings concerning any insolvent firm.  
   From these souces, we are thus able to compose a data set in which any firm is characterized 
by qualitative information (size, industry, age, location governance), quantitative ratios (cash 
flow, financial debt, trade debt, interest charges…) and a judicial history. This last piece of 
information is in fact an original variable  coming from a concatenation of the events 
corresponding to each firm from the moment it has been declared insolvent by a commercial 
judge 
-  Step 1: 
between 2007 and 2010. It is constructed following these basic rules: 
A set of events and quotations associated with a form of failure are extracted 
from the
-  Step 2: 
  Register  of insolvent firms (Bulletin Officiel des Annonces Civiles et 
Commerciales - BODACC)  
Quotations are aggregated into six categories depending on legal standards (assets 
sales, rescuing, liquidation, dissolution, cancellation, closing for lack of assets)
-  Step 3: 
  
By classifying a series of 10 consecutive legal operations according to the dates of 
decisions, we obtain a consistent legal history for more than 98% of firms from the sample. They 
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   The sample consists then in a set of 143,114 firms with 10 employees or more operating in the 
major sectors of the French economy. All these companies were operating in 2007 and 7,831 
(5.47%) experienced an insolvency leading them to file a petition for bankruptcy between 2007 
and 2010. Among these firms whose cessation of payments has been considered as effective by a 
judgment, 1,816 have been liquidated and 6,015 have been reorganized. Among these rescue 
attempts, 3,324 can be considered as successful as the firms were still operating in 2010 whereas 9 
 
2,691 failed as the companies were finally liquidated later on. Table1
4
Stage 1 : Entry into the 
bankruptcy proceedings 
 sums up this breakdown 
whereas tables 3, 4 and 5 present details about activity, size and integration within a corporate 
group for the different sub-samples.  
Table 1: Characteristics of the sample 
Stage 2 : Initial decision of the 





















135,283  7,831  1,816  6,015  2,691  3,324 
   From these three stages one can identify 3 possible bifurcations which correspond to 3 models 
seeking to explain what differentiates between the companies at each stage of the process. Three 
explained variables are then identified: 
i)  Entry into the proceeding, 
ii)  Rescue attempts, 
iii)  Long term survival. 
3.2  Hypotheses and explanatory variables  
   This section gathers the previous theoretical arguments and considers more recent empirical 
findings in order to propose four hypotheses (H1 to H4) on the motives that are expected to 
drive the arbitration between the different possible judicial solutions to firm distress. Each 
developed hypothesis does not lead to a definitive prediction but rather highlights a balance 
between the main variables that may influence the way of resolving default. 
   Hypothesis 1 focuses on the market and suggests that the firms able to sell their products are 
less likely subject to a cessation of payments. It follows the ‘Porterian’ view according to which 
firms benefiting from a dynamic geographical or industrial environment have a higher probability 
of success than companies that do not benefit from such positive externalities. Indeed, 
   The second hypothesis deals with the cost and the availability of the different financial sources 
and with the financial structure. 
business 
failure is all the more probable as the firm faces difficulties in selling its product which may cause 
a continuous decline in turnover as well as a decrease in profitability. We might thus expect a 
positive sign associated with turnover declines and a negative one for profitability. Conversely, 
the chances to obtain a reorganization plan or to survive in the future are lower in a context of 
economic crisis which significantly impacts both variables. The proportion of inventories and 
receivables in the total assets can become more and more important leading to a lack of cash-
flow that can be a signal of insolvency. Inventories and receivables are then positively correlated 
to the cessation of payments. Things may differ when one considers rescuing. Indeed, in 
assessing the capacity of recovery of a distressed company, judges have to estimate its operability 
which depends on the volume of available inventories and net cash-flows. These two indicators 
are thus positively correlated to any rescue attempts or firms' survival in the long run.  
Descriptive statistics (table5) show that companies 
                                                           
4 For a more detailed presentation of the initial sample and the different sub-samples, see tables N° 5 and beyond in 
appendices.  
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of payments are characterized by a lower level of long term financial resources than sound ones. 
This difference is still valid, even if less visible, when one firstly compares firms that benefit from 
a rescue attempt to the ones that are immediately liquidated and secondly compares surviving 
firms to definitely bankrupt ones. Even if one no longer considers that a unique optimal financial 
structure may be identified, the pecking order theory supports the idea that companies prioritize 
their sources of financing (from internal financing to equity) according to which the principle of 
least effort, or of least resistance, preferring to raise equity as a financing means of last resort. 
Hence, internal funds are used first, and when they are depleted, debt is issued. When it is not 
sensible to issue any more debt, equity is issued (Donaldson, 1961; Myers and Majluf, 1984). The 
ability of the firm to finance its investments by itself appears as a crucial factor for its stability. 
Thus, a high initial level of financial resources (equity and long-term debt) can protect the firm 
from a risk of failure. However, as shown by table 5, the rate of indebtedness (long and short-
term debts, financial debt, tax debt and payables) is also positively correlated to the probability of 
i) cessation of payments and ii) liquidation. Creditors  demand immediate payments  of  prior 
amounts due. Pressures on the firm become so high that the firm can no longer respect its 
commitments. On the contrary, the attempts of recovery and, consequently, the improvement of 
the firms' situation, are associated with a significant reduction in the proportion of debt in total 
liabilities. 
   Hypothesis 3 insists upon the corporate governance considering that firms integrated in large 
corporate groups are more likely to be supported by the parent company and thus less likely to 
be insolvent.  
This relationship supports the idea that companies in a favorable position towards 
creditors have more chances to be rescued and/or to survive than the rationed ones. 
   Hypothesis 4 takes into account Gibrat’s law as it introduces firm’s age and size as a factor of 
resilience but also as arguments used by judges to determine whether the insolvent company 
must be reorganized. Such a question is one of the main focuses of the Law and economics 
approach as the comparisons between French law, considered as an archetype of civil law, and 
English insolvency law taken as representative of common law countries often underline the 
primacy of employment to explain the decisions made by the French commercial  courts. 
Descriptive statistics do not permit to observe clear differences between defaulting, immediately 
liquidated and liquidated after a rescue attempt compared to normally operating, rescued and 
finally successful companies. However, we introduce size  corrected by age in the different 
models to bring some evidence to the debate on this question. 
   To verify these hypotheses, we test a number of financial variables used in research over the 
last three decades (see e.g. Beaver 1966; Altman 1968; Altman et al. 1977; Ohlson 1980; 
Zmijewski 1984; Casey and Bartczak 1985; Gentry et al. 1985; Jones 1987). These financial 
measures include ratios based on operating cash flow; working capital; profitability, turnover; 
financial structure; and debt-servicing capacity. Let us now briefly comment on the contextual 
variables. In contrast to previous research, which has tended to be restricted to industrial or 
manufacturing firms (Jones 1987), this study tests the predictive value of financial variables on 
ten disaggregated sectors: This classification approach has been adopted for a variety of reasons: 
(1) it recognizes that  industry sectors are structurally different and have different financing, 
operating, and investing  characteristics  which  can undermine inter-sector comparability and 
generalization (Ohlson 1980). We attempt to capture sector-specific effects in our modeling in 
order to  make determinations about the generalization  of our results; (2) the classification 
approach gives explicit recognition to the economic characteristics of the  French economy, 
particularly the unequaled importance of the services sectors. Structural variables such as size, 
age and integration in a corporate group matter too. We assume that the larger the firm, the 
higher the probability to operate normally, to benefit from a reorganization decision and to 11 
 
survive after a rescue. The same relationships are in force as one observes age and integration in 
a large group. Alternatively, the failures mostly concern independent, small and young firms.  
•  Structural variables: Size, age, business group affiliation, industry, localization 
Finally, four sets of explanatory variables are introduced in the equation to be estimated: 
•  Financial variables: Total debt to total assets, debt cost  
•  Commercial variables: turnover, inventories  
•  Performance variable: profitability  
Table 2: Expected signs of explanatory variables 
Table 2 sum up the signs of the estimated coefficients. 
Variables 
Stage 1 : cessation of 





Stage 3 : long term 
survival vs. subsequent 
liquidation 
Size (Employees)  -  +  + 
Age  -  +  + 
Group affiliation   -  +  + 
Turnover decrease   +  -  - 
Long-term financial 
resources 
-  +  + 
Financial debt  +  -  - 
Tax payable ratio  +  -  - 
Profitability ratio  -  +  + 
Inventories ratios  +  + 
Receivables ratio 
+ 
+  -  - 
Cash flow ratio  -  + 
 
+ 
3.3  Estimation technique 
 
   Contrary to the previous works, which considered default resolution as a static process (simple 
LOGIT or simple PROBIT approaches), we model the arbitration between the various legal 
solutions as a dynamic process which consists of the following steps: 
 
•  First step: the judge and/or the debtor arbitrate between either embracing 
bankruptcy or staying in business. 
•  Second step: based on the fact that bankruptcy was opted for in the first step, 
debtors, creditors and judges are left with two options: to opt for a rescue of the 
company or to prefer an immediate liquidation. 
•  Third step : the rescue attempt may be either a success in the sense that the company 
is still in business some years after the decision is made or a failure if the rescued 
company finally re-files a petition in bankruptcy or is liquidated 
 
   Facing a situation of insolvency can be regarded as a random event and, therefore, analyzed by 
discrete probability choices. Different probability distribution functions have been proposed in 
the literature to analyze dichotomous variables. A discussion of some of these functions can be 
found in Cox and Snell (1989). The choice of the logistic distribution function in the present 12 
 
study has two advantages. Its mathematical formulation allows flexibility of the analysis and thus 
facilitates the interpretation of results thanks to the possibility to calculate odds ratios and 
marginal effects of explanatory variables. 
   Three logistic models have been estimated corresponding to as many stages of the insolvency 
process. In each stage a different probability is estimated indicating the firm's position in the 
bankruptcy process. The first model estimates the probability of a firm entering the bankruptcy 
proceedings within the next three years, while the second one evaluates the probability that it will 
obtain a plan of business reorganization from the commercial court judge. The third model 
estimates the likelihood of exiting the bankruptcy process and staying in business.  
   These three models describe the insolvency path using the same set of explanatory variables. 
The main concern here is to try to assess whether there are different explanations which can be 
given for each stage or whether the entire insolvency process may merely be explained by the 
same variables, which is a rather strong assumption. 
   In different models, the estimated probability depends on the size of the firm, its age, its 
possible affiliation to a group, its financial resources, its profitability and its production capacity. 
We adjust for the specific local characteristics by taking into account the company location based 
on our breakdown of French territory into six regions (Greater Paris region, North West, North 
East, South West, South East, Central region). The sectoral affiliation may also be a source of 
differences between firms in terms of insolvency. We distinguish ten sectors: manufacturing 
industries,  food  industries,  communication technologies industry, restaurants  and hotels, 
construction, retailing, transport, business services (except personal services), intellectual services 
and business administration. We control for this effect by adding a dummy variable for each 
sector minus one.   
   For the three logistic models, let   be a binary variable equals to 1 if we observe the event of 
interest (entry into bankruptcy proceedings, obtaining a plan of reorganization, still in business at 
the end of the process, respectively) and 0 otherwise. For the first stage model, for instance, let 
 denote the probability that a firm will enter into bankruptcy proceedings. The probability that 
the firm does not experience this situation is noted  . The logistic procedure models the 
ratio of these two probabilities as a linear function in the explanatory variables. 
   The logistic equation to estimate for each stage using the corresponding 2007 cross section 
data, can be written as follows: 
 
We can formulate 
in the same way the likelihood of observing events of interest in the second and third stage of 
bankruptcy proceedings.          
   with: 
: Number of employees at the end of the year 2007 
 Firm age in 2007 
: Dummy variable indicating a possible firm affiliation to a group 13 
 
: Dummy variable indicating three successive decreases in annual turnover 
: Long term financial resources ratio 
: Receivables ratio 
T : Tax payable ratio 
: Gross operating surplus to total assets 
: Financial debt ratio 
: Raw materials inventories ratio 
: Outstanding inventories ratio 
F : Finished products inventories ratio 
: Cash-flow ratio 
: Sectoral dummies (j=1, ..., 10) 
: Regional dummies (k=1, ..., 6) 
   The above equation is estimated by the Maximum Likelihood using Stata 11.2 software for the 
three stages. Each model has been run on a different sample of the year 2007. These samples 
were determined by the firm's situation in bankruptcy proceedings. The results are given in table 
7 in appendices.  
In the following section we discuss the main empirical results before concluding with some 
comments on their theoretical implications.  
4  Results and discussion 
   The results for estimating three models are presented in Tables 
4.1 
2, 3 and 4 and commented on 
in this section. 
 Cessation of payments vs. normal activity 
   The results we obtained for this first model (Table 7) confirm the economic part of the path to 
insolvency described in section 2.1.2. Insolvent firms have a lower level of working capital, are 
more indebted (trade and financial debt), pay more interest on debts, experience a significant 
decrease in sales combined with an increase in inventories (regardless of the type of goods 
considered, raw materials, finished products  or  outstanding)  and, finally, exhibit a  net cash 
degradation as well as a declining  profitability.  The  firm’s  accounting and  strategic  path 
dependencies are adjusted for structural and environmental effects. Beyond a certain level, age 
and  size  protect  against failure.  Indeed, insolvency  primarily concerns  young,  small  and 
independent companies. The integration within a corporate group always protects companies 
from failure, in particular because of the greater security of funding provided by this form of 
organization
   The  modeling of the probability of  filing  a petition for bankruptcy confirms the set of 
hypotheses. It is inasmuch higher as the company faces problems accessing the market (positive 
sign associated to 3 continuous decreases in turnover, inventories ratios and receivables), has to 
solve problems linked to availability and/or cost of financial resources: the probability of failing 
is greater for firms whose financial debts, tax and social insurance debts are the highest whereas 
self-financing is significantly lower. Hypothesis 3 is also verified as the sign associated to the 
. As a result of this first model, one can state that firms with the lowest endowments 
and whose operating costs are the highest more often experience a cessation of payments than 
efficient ones. 14 
 
variable “being integrated into a group” is negative whereas large and old firms are significantly more 
able to resist failure, as suggested by hypothesis 4. 
4.2  Liquidation vs. rescue  
   As an extension of the first model focused mainly on the economic part of the insolvency 
path, this second model aims at highlighting the rationality of the judges when they have to 
decide to close a business or rescue it. The results of the estimation firstly bring some evidence 
about the order that prevails in the sequence of events leading up to liquidation. Indeed, when 
compared to firms liquidated immediately after having filed for bankruptcy, reorganized 
companies are characterized by a lower level of debts. This situation attests to the facts that 
creditors still trust these debtors and are ready to lend them more money in order to make it 
possible the restructuring of the business. No difference is however observed as far as the other 
kinds  of debts are concerned as the coefficients are not significant. Hypothesis 2,  which 
concerns the role of financing structure and availability, is thus partially verified in this second 
stage. 
   On the contrary, hypothesis 1 is confirmed since  upon  deciding  to rescue a company, 
commercial judges systematically take into account the relationships between the firm and its 
customers. Indeed, firstly, rescued companies have more important inventories of raw materials 
and outstanding production than others. The importance of these operating assets indicates a 
company's ability to restart an activity. Correlatively, rescued companies bear a lower ratio of 
trade receivables, a worse cash situation and a higher indebtedness than the ones that are directly 
liquidated. Integration into a corporate group tackled by hypothesis 3 is absolutely crucial in this 
decision process. Indeed, the coefficient associated to the variable “being included in a corporate 
group” is particularly high. This confirms the idea that as a shareholder, a corporate group has 
the power to both  finance the reorganization on a distressed company and restore the 
confidence of the judges and other creditors in the capacity of the company to succeed in this 
process. Individual  resilience  exemplified by age and size is also a significant factor in 
determining the probability of being rescued. 
   To sum up the main result of this second model we may state that commercial 
Another possible explanation of the positive 
correlation between size and rescue attempt is the impact on employment of the area; indeed, 
one can easily understand that the commercial court can hesitate closing a business without any 
attempt to reorganize it, especially when the local or macroeconomic context is depressed which 
was the case during the period 2007-2010. 
judges primarily 
try to save businesses with the best chance of long-term survival
4.3 
 and whose role on labor market 
is the most important. 
Long term survival vs. subsequent liquidation  
   The results of the third model that estimates the probability of survival after a petition for 
bankruptcy  show  that  companies  which are able to recover present  several  significant 
characteristics that however differ from the ones identified in the first model which discriminates 
between  going concerns and distressed companies.  The firms which  emerge  from a 
reorganization plan successfully have demonstrated their capacity to stabilize their business, no 
longer exhibit a steady decline in their turnover and have renewed their inventories of finished 
products.  Beyond  its  purely  operational  aspects, the growing  weight  of these inventories  is 
characteristic of optimistic expectations on the future sales on the part of the management team. 
This productive recovery combines with a significant improvement in the financial structure 
mainly visible through the negative correlation between the probability of still being in business 15 
 
after a reorganization plan and the ratio of receivables. Everything happens as if successful 
companies do not need to convince customers to buy their products by proposing attractive 
terms of payment. This situation contributes to the slackening of the constraint of liquidity 
attested by the positive sign associated to the variable “cash”. As a consequence of this 
operational and financial recovery,  the increase in profitability is strongly and  positively 
associated with the probability of survival after a reorganization plan.  
   As in the previous cases, the four stated hypotheses are confirmed by this last model. The 
relationship between market conditions and survival is validated as, once again, the probability of 
success is negatively correlated to the variable “3 successive decreases in the annual turnover” as 
well as to the share of receivables in the total assets and to the weight of finished products 
inventories, whereas the coefficients associated with the two other types of inventories are not 
significant. Hypothesis 2 is not verified at this stage of the insolvency path since no external 
financial resource plays a role in differentiating between successful and failing firms once they 
have implemented a reorganization plan. One may assume that at this stage of the rescuing 
process the companies with the most severe financial problems have been eliminated during the 
second stage so they cannot pretend to benefit from a rescue attempt. However, if external 
financial resources do not make any differences between the two possible cases, profitability 
appears to play a strong and positive role in determining the probability of survival of previously 
distressed companies. A possible explanation of the difference between the crucial role of this 
exogenous variable and the other ones illustrating the financial relationships of distressed firms 
has to do with the twofold sense of profitability. It is both an indicator of the capability of a 
company to self-finance its activity and a  “residue” to be shared between reinvestment or 
dividends to the shareholders. This last interpretation probably prevails in this model so that one 
may consider, just as in the first model that firms making profits are less likely to fail than 
unprofitable ones. The third hypothesis concerning the role of the relationships with the parent 
company is never confirmed as most companies remaining in the last sub-set are integrated in 
corporate groups, independent ones being very rare at this stage of the process. It is then not 
surprising to observe that no evidence in favor of the robustness of the third hypothesis is 
brought by the estimation. As a way of testing the capacity of resilience of companies which are 
victims of financial difficulties, hypothesis 4 introduced the age and the size as differential 
variables. This last variable is not significant. The smallest companies tend to be immediately 
liquidated without any rescue  attempt mainly because their exit from  the market has no 
important consequences on local employment. Age plays a significant but non prominent role. 
The positive correlation between age and the probability of  survival  may be connected to 
accumulated experience, skills and know-how which can be assimilated to intangible resources. 
These resources can be mobilized to strengthen the effects of the decisions made to restore 
competitiveness. 
5  Conclusion 
   In order to conclude with this final stage we may consider that firms able to mobilize their 
internal resources in order to renew the goods they produce and to improve their market share 
have the highest probability of long-term survival. 
   The purpose of this paper was to provide a framework which goes beyond a dichotomist 
choice between operating and bankrupt firms in order to better understand how companies fail. 
To do so, we began by proposing an analytical approach compatible with a gradual conception 
of insolvency. Companies whose financial and economic ratios reflect a real distress have to 
leave the economic world to file a petition for bankruptcy, entering then in a judicial world 16 
 
characterized by rules going beyond the pure respect of prior commitments. Along this so-called 
insolvency path three mile-stones can be noticed. The first one consists in the declaration of 
insolvency and draws  a separation line between going concerns  and firms in cessation of 
payments. The second one appears at the moment the commercial judges have to decide, in 
accordance with debtors and creditors to liquidate or to rescue the insolvent company. The third 
one, coming several years after the implementation of the reorganization plan, signals the end of 
the path as it gives an official recognition either of the definitive failure of the reorganized 
company or of the favorable outcome of the process, i.e., the firm’s survival and renewal with 
success. 
   From this progressive framework we are able to draw two types of conclusion. The first one 
deals with the differences in the profile of the firms from the moment where the difficulties are 
officially recognized to their effective disappearance, whereas the second one concerns the 
judgment we can bear about the rationale of the French insolvency law. 
   Corporate insolvency law  can  draw a line between  healthy firms  endowed  with sufficient 
resources in the economic order and companies whose difficulties are so significant that they 
undermine their ability to meet their commitments and cause the switch to a second order, the 
legal system. The importance of the definition of failure and the borders between healthy and 
distressed companies did not escape the legislator. Changes brought to corporate insolvency Law 
support this assumption. This law determines the rules of exit from the market. It is used as a 
corporate demography restructuring tool and, therefore, allows an adaptation of the economy. It 
is positioned at the heart of the Schumpeterian process of creative destruction, and contributes 
significantly to determine its severity.  
   Analysis of Law in the Court rather than Law in the Book shows that the rationality of commercial 
court is not a strict application of an invariable procedure. The three sequential models we study 
show that judges have to consider the economic reality of companies to make their decisions. 
The changes in the signs and level of coefficients associated with  the different explanatory 
variables contrast with the pro-debtor French conception of insolvency law popularized by Doing 
Business reports and the theory of legal origins. Indeed, even if commercial courts are clearly 
preoccupied by the consequences of firms exit from the market as suggested by the importance 
of the variable Size, measured by the number of employees, it is also clear that the possibilities 
and the conditions of access to financial resources also motivate the decision to declare 
insolvency, to reorganize or, in the end, to liquidate a company. The importance of the individual 
characteristics of the firms appears also through the significance of coefficients associated with 
the variables. It  illustrates  the quality of the relationships between the company and its 
customers. So, far from being mainly, or even only, preoccupied by the survival of the company 
in order to preserve employment and continued economic activity, French commercial judges 
appear to be influenced in their decision-making by the firm’s resilience as reflected by the usual 
accounting ratios. 
   Some limits should however be pointed out. The first one has to do with a bias in the sample. 
Indeed, despite all the possibilities offered by the law, bankruptcy proceedings almost always end 
with the liquidation of the company. This creates a distortion in the result we obtain insofar as 
the observed rates of rescue attempts exceed 76% in the studied population whereas they are 
about 10% in the total population. This major difference comes from the fact that, due to the 
sources mobilized, our database only includes firms with 10 employees or more and presents an 
abnormally high proportion of industrial companies. Another limit comes from the arbitrary cut-
off of the procedure three years after the entry. These two drawbacks are however impossible to 
avoid as no exhaustive database of firms employing fewer than 10 workers exists in France. 17 
 
Another limit to underline concerns the period we studied. Centering primarily on 2007-2010, 
our purpose was to focus on the most recent available data. However, the last three years 
correspond to the most  severe economic crisis of  the last sixty years making  it difficult to 
generalize our results. In order to limit the idiosyncratic conclusion, we intend to enlarge this 
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Appendices 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the total population in 2007 (143 114 companies with 10 
employees and more) (Source: EAE INSEE-LIFI-DIANE) 
 
Industry in 2007  1 Cessation of 
payment 
Stage I 
2 Normal activity  Total 
%  Number  %  Number  %  Number 
Food industries  3.9  212  96.1  5,256  100  5,468 
Manufacturing industries   8.1  2,271  91.9  25,693  100  27,964 
NTIC  5.3  338  94.7  6,080  100  6,418 
Hotels and restaurants  3.0  317  97.0  10,133  100  10,450 
Construction   6.4  1,517  93.6  22,033  100  23,550 
Retailing  4.1  1,601  95.9  37,142  100  38,743 
Transport and mail  6.4  669  93.6  9,755  100  10,424 
Business services  6.6  528  93.4  7,472  100  8,000 
Intellectual services  3.0  306  97.0  9,841  100  10,147 
Business administration  3.7  72  96.3  1,878  100  1,950 
  Size in 2007     
[10-19] employees  5.2  3,354  94.8  61,757  100  65,111 
[20-249] employees  5.9  4,330  94.1  68,653  100  72,983 
[250 employees and more  2.9  147  97.1  4,873  100  5,020 
Group affiliation in 2007        
Independent firms  6.4  6,282  93.6  91,279  100  97,561 
Firms belonging to a group  3.4  1,549  96.6  44,004  100  45,553 
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Table 4:  Descriptive statistics in 2007 of 7831 companies which entered bankruptcy 
proceedings between 2007 and 2010 (Source: EAE INSEE-LIFI-DIANE) 
1 Rescue attempt   Industry in 2007  2 Immediate 
liquidation 
Total 
%  Stage II  Number  %  Number  %  Number  
Food industries  87.3  185  12.7  27  100  212 
Manufacturing industries   87.0  1,976  13.0  295  100  2,271 
NTIC  75.4  255  24.6  83  100  338 
Hotels and restaurants  83.3  264  16.7  53  100  317 
Construction   73.1  1,109  26.9  408  100  1,517 
Retailing  67.8  1,085  32.2  516  100  1,601 
Transport and mail  73.5  492  26.5  177  100  669 
Business services  65.0  343  35.0  185  100  528 
Intellectual services  77.8  238  22.2  68  100  306 
Business administration  94.4  68  5.6  4  100  72 
  Size in 2007     
[10-19] employees  70.4  2,362  29.6  992  100  3,354 
[20-249] employees  81.1  3,513  18.9  817  100  4,330 
[250 employees and more  95.2  140  4.8  7  100  147 
Group affiliation in 2007        
Independent firms  73.1  4,591  26.9  1,691  100  6,282 
Firms belonging to a group  91.9  1,424  8.1  125  100  1,549 21 
 
Table 5:  Descriptive statistics in
 
  2007  of  6015  companies  having exited  bankruptcy 
proceedings between 2007 and 2010 (Source: EAE INSEE-LIFI-DIANE) 
Industry in 2007  1 Rescued 
Stage III 
2 Liquidation  Total 
%  Number  %  Number  %  Number 
Food industries  57.3  106  42.7  79  100  185 
Manufacturing industries   58.7  1,159  41.3  817  100  1,976 
NTIC  48.2  123  51.8  132  100  255 
Hotels and restaurants  70.8  187  29.2  77  100  264 
Construction   49.4  548  50.6  561  100  1,109 
Retailing  49.3  535  50.7  550  100  1,085 
Transport and mail  56.7  279  43.3  213  100  492 
Business services  57.1  196  42.9  147  100  343 
Intellectual services  59.7  142  40.3  96  100  238 
Business administration  72.1  49  27.9  19  100  68 
Total  55.3  3,324  44.7  2,691  100  6,015 
  Size in 2007     
[10-19] employees  58.3  1,377  41.7  985  100  2,362 
[20-249] employees  53.0  1,861  47.0  1,652  100  3,513 
[250 employees and more  61.4  86  38.6  54  100  140 
Total  55.3  3,324  44.7  2,691  100  6,015 
Group affiliation in 2007        
Independent firms  53.5  2,455  46.5  2,136  100  4,591 
Firms belonging to a group  61.0  869  39.0  555  100  1,424 













Table 6 - Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables used in models 
  N.  Missing 
values 
10th 25  
percentile 
th







(number of employees) 
7,831  Cessation of payments    10  13  22  39  76 
135,283  Normal activity    10  13  21  42  97 
6,015  Rescuing    10  14  24  43  89 
1,816  Liquidation    10  12  18  28  45 
3,324  Long term survival  ,  10  14  23  43  91 
2,691  Subsequent liquidation  ,  11  15  25  43  86 
Age 
6,876  Cessation of payments  955  3  6  13  23  37 
125,973  Normal activity  9,310  4  9  17  27  41 
5,528  Rescuing  487  3  7  14  24  39 
1,348  Liquidation  468  2  5  10  19  32 
3,141  Long term survival  183  3  7  15  25  41 
2,387  Subsequent liquidation  304  3  6  13  22  38 
Long term financial 
resources 
4,747  Cessation of payments  3,084  -0.436  -0.013  0.156  0.311  0.462 
113,659  Normal activity  21,624  0.090  0.221  0.373  0.525  0.662 
3,981  Rescuing  2,034  -0.421  -0.013  0.158  0.315  0.462 
766  Liquidation  1,050  -0.549  -0.018  0.138  0.284  0.460 
2,682  Long term survival  642  -0.381  0.002  0.172  0.332  0.484 
1,299  Subsequent liquidation  1,392  -0.478  -0.045  0.135  0.278  0.425 
Receivables 
4,747  Cessation of payments  3,084  0.162  0.315  0.504  0.693  0.824 
113,659  Normal activity  21,624  0.082  0.228  0.421  0.609  0.772 
3,981  Rescuing  2,034  0.160  0.309  0.492  0.679  0.812 
766  Liquidation  1,050  0.181  0.360  0.570  0.763  0.895 
2,682  Long term survival  642  0.144  0.297  0.479  0.655  0.795 
1,299  Subsequent liquidation  1,392  0.188  0.338  0.523  0.713  0.840 
Tax payable ratio 
3,981  Cessation of payments  2,034  0.055  0.107  0.197  0.338  0.547 
766  Normal activity  1,050  0.000  0.102  0.235  0.402  0.630 
4,747  Rescuing  3,084  0.051  0.106  0.202  0.350  0.568 
113,659  Liquidation  21,624  0.045  0.081  0.140  0.223  0.332 
2,682  Long term survival  642  0.055  0.104  0.190  0.327  0.536 
1,299  Subsequent liquidation  1,392  0.055  0.116  0.208  0.365  0.565 
Profitability 
4,747  Cessation of payments  3,084  -0.257  -0.090  0.020  0.098  0.197 
113,659  Normal activity  21,624  -0.038  0.031  0.097  0.182  0.294 
3,981  Rescuing  2,034  -0.248  -0.089  0.019  0.095  0.188 
766  Liquidation  1,050  -0.292  -0.092  0.029  0.124  0.263 
2,682  Long term survival  642  -0.211  -0.064  0.027  0.103  0.194 
1,299  Subsequent liquidation  1,392  -0.327  -0.133  -0.006  0.078  0.172 
Financial debt ratio 
3,981  Cessation of payments  2,034  0.009  0.061  0.179  0.345  0.572 
766  Normal activity  1,050  0.000  0.021  0.129  0.303  0.537 
4,747  Rescuing  3,084  0.006  0.055  0.172  0.340  0.570 
113,659  Liquidation  21,624  0.000  0.026  0.112  0.257  0.442 
2,682  Long term survival  642  0.012  0.065  0.178  0.339  0.572 
1,299  Subsequent liquidation  1,392  0.006  0.052  0.183  0.357  0.571 
Cash flow ratio  
4,747  Cessation of payments  3,084  -0.670  -0.504  -0.329  -0.150  0.002 
113,659  Normal activity  21,624  -0.514  -0.344  -0.156  0.027  0.235 
3,981  Rescuing  2,034  -0.668  -0.504  -0.334  -0.162  -0.017 
766  Liquidation  1,050  -0.692  -0.499  -0.296  -0.070  0.092 
2,682  Long term survival  642  -0.653  -0.484  -0.324  -0.153  -0.006 
1,299  Subsequent liquidation  1,392  -0.710  -0.545  -0.360  -0.186  -0.042 
Raw materials inventories 
ratio 
4,747  Cessation of payments  3,084  0.000  0.000  0.020  0.088  0.176 
113,659  Normal activity  21,624  0.000  0.000  0.002  0.035  0.108 
3,981  Rescuing  2,034  0.000  0.000  0.025  0.096  0.181 
766  Liquidation  1,050  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.045  0.134 
2,682  Long term survival  642  0.000  0.000  0.027  0.096  0.179 
1,299  Subsequent liquidation  1,392  0.000  0.000  0.022  0.094  0.186 
Outstanding inventories 
ratio 
4,747  Cessation of payments  3,084  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.044  0.130 
113,659  Normal activity  21,624  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.006  0.066 
3,981  Rescuing  2,034  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.048  0.134 
766  Liquidation  1,050  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.022  0.102 
2,682  Long term survival  642  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.049  0.133 
1,299  Subsequent liquidation  1,392  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.043  0.136 
Finished products 
inventories ratio 
4,747  Cessation of payments  3,084  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.087 
113,659  Normal activity  21,624  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.018 
3,981  Rescuing  2,034  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.096 
766  Liquidation  1,050  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
2,682  Long term survival  642  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.106 
1,299  Subsequent liquidation  1,392  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.076 
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Tableau 7: Logit estimation of the probability of entering bankruptcy proceedings 
 
Variables 
First stage  
model 
Second stage  
model 
Third stage  
model 
       
Size (number of employees)  -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.01**  0.001 
  (0.004)  (0.000) 
Age  -0.01***  0.02***  0.01*** 
  (0.001)  (0.005)  (0.003) 
Group affiliation  -0.58***  0.39**  -0.01 
  (0.046)  (0.166)  (0.095) 
Turnover decrease  0.85***  0.54*  -0.32* 
  (0.096)  (0.316)  (0.164) 
Long term financial resources  -2.29***  0.15  0.00 
  (0.117)  (0.153)  (0.138) 
Receivables  0.19  -0.48*  -0.79*** 
  (0.114)  (0.273)  (0.221) 
Financial debt ratio  2.45***  0.09  0.03 
  (0.181)  (0.239)  (0.229) 
Profitability  -2.64***  -0.23  1.42*** 
  (0.151)  (0.233)  (0.223) 
Tax payable ratio  0.86***  0.53**  0.16 
  (0.114)  (0.249)  (0.182) 
Raw materials' inventories ratio  2.19***  1.36*  -0.10 
  (0.295)  (0.819)  (0.554) 
1.64***  Outstanding inventories ratio  2.11**  0.53 
  (0.286)  (0.846)  (0.624) 
Finished products inventories ratio  3.79***  1.25  1.54** 
  (0.492)  (1.285)  (0.779) 
Cash flow ratio  -0.98***  -0.62***  0.32* 
  (0.097)  (0.208)  (0.171) 
Sectoral dummies  yes  yes  yes 
Regional dummies  yes  yes  yes 
Constant  -2.80***  0.60**  0.79*** 
  (0.115)  (0.267)  (0.212) 
       
Observations  105,945  4,250  3,551 
Pseudo R-squared  0.16  0.09  0.03 
Log likelihood  -13606.67  -1633.25  -2157.14 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
 
 